Studying Administrative Law: A Methodology for, and Report on, New Empirical Research by Elliott, E. Donald & Schuck, Peter H
519
STUDYING ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW: A METHODOLOGY FOR,
AND REPORT ON, NEW
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
Peter H. Schuck* and E. Donald Elliottt
his article reports on an empirical study of some broad trends in
federal administrative law that was recently concluded. Although
the complete study is published elsewhere,I we also report our findings
here for two reasons. First, we hope to broaden the audience for this
research, especially among practicing administrative lawyers. We be-
lieve that the study provides some important and intriguing new per-
spectives on a number of issues: the changing style of appellate decisions
in administrative law; the evolution of administrative law since the mid-
1960s; the patterns of remands to administrative agencies; and the
effects of the Supreme Court's Chevron decision. Second, we wish to
call particular attention to the methodology of our study in the hope
that other researchers will use it to probe additional questions of in-
terest to administrative lawyers and scholars. 2
*Simeon E. Baldwin Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
tAssistant Administrator and General Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency; Professor of Law, Yale Law School (on leave of absence).
The authors wish to acknowledge the financial support of the Administrative Con-
ference of the United States under Contract #AC8702013 and of the Yale Law School's
Center for Studies in Law, Economics and Public Policy, as well as the research as-
sistance of many students at Georgetown University Law Center and Yale Law School.
Of these, David Elias and Nancy Ribaudo of Georgetown and Bob Easton and Tim
Obst of Yale deserve special mention and thanks. Vik Raina, a computer science
student at Yale, assisted Professor Elliott with programming. We are also grateful for
the comments and suggestions received at the Yale Law School Faculty Workshop,
and the discussion at the 1989 meetings of the Adminstrative Law sections of the
American Association of Law Schools and the American Bar Association. Our col-
league at Yale, Professor Roberta Romano, deserves special mention for her help in
refining our techniques for analyzing some of our data, as well as for her trenchant
comments on earlier drafts. We, of course, are solely responsible for any errors that
remain.
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This article, which consists essentially of excerpts from the long pub-
lished study, is divided into three parts. In Part I, we introduce our
study by placing it in a larger intellectual context. Part II describes
our research methodology. Part III summarizes the study's principal
findings.
I.
We began with a puzzling fact. Although the study of administrative
law started in earnest more than fifty years ago, we still know little
about what is perhaps the central question in that field: how does ju-
dicial review actually affect agency decisionmaking? This question goes
to the fundamental nature and quality of the modern administrative
state, yet academic specialists have largely neglected it;3 the subject
remains a matter for uninformed speculation. 4
Despite (or perhaps because of) the lack of data, strong opinions on
this question are common. Our conversations and our reading per-
suade us that every self-respecting administrative lawyer has firm, if
not always articulate or even consistent, convictions about the effect
of judicial review upon agencies. Proof for this assertion abounds.
Lawyers and their clients devote vast resources to challenging agency
actions in the courts. 5 With Talmudic intensity, legions of legal schol-
ars analyze the language and logic ofjudicial opinions in administrative
law cases in their classrooms and professional journals. 6 Agencies
I'he few exceptions in the legal literature involve a consideration of this question
in quite particular contexts. See, e.g., Williams, Hybrid Rulemaking Under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 42 U. Cm. L. REV. 401, 425-36 (1975) (discussing response by
three agencies to judicial interpretation of APA requiring more formal procedures in
informal rulemaking by EPA); Leventhal, Environmental Decision Making and the Role
of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 554-55 (1974) (discussing EPA's response to
remand in International Harvester case). A broader empirical study of the court-
agency relationship, Gardner, Federal Courts and Agencies: An Audit of the Partnership
Books, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 800 (1975), focuses upon judicial strategies of supervision
rather than upon how agencies respond to remands. See generally P. SCHUCK, SUING
GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 3-12, 125-81 (1983), and
sources cited therein.
Some political scientists have examined this question. See, e.g., R. MELNICK, REGU-
LATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR AcT (1983); S. WASBY, THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1987).
'This irony, of course, is common to all fields, not just law. By some perversity of
intellectual inquiry, the most interesting and important questions in life are usually
the most elusive and opaque.
'The number of administrative law cases in the federal appellate courts is large
and growing. See Schuck & Elliott, supra note 1, at Chart 1.
'i'here are several publications devoted exclusively to administrative law doctrine.
See, e.g., the Administrative Law Review (published by the American Bar Association)
and the Administrative Law Journal of the American University. There are also nu-
merous specialized journals concerned with judicial review of agency decisions in par-
ticular policy areas (e.g.,Journal of Air Law and Commerce; Journal of Energy Law and
Policy), and at least one leading law review publishes an annual administrative law issue
(the April issue of the Duke Law Journal).
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themselves exhibit much concern about how reviewing courts respond
to their handiwork. Manifestly, the "experts" act as if judicial review
of agency action was worth fighting, writing, and worrying about. They
believe, in short, that what courts say to agencies matters, and matters
deeply.
But although there may be widespread agreement that judicial re-
view of agency action matters, there is no consensus about precisely
how and under what circumstances it matters. As Jerry Mashaw and David
Harfst recently put it, "The normative expectations of administrative
lawyers have seldom been subjected to empirical verification of a more
than anecdotal sort. '- 7 And different observers evidently rely upon dif-
ferent anecdotes.
Most administrative law writers and teachers-and virtually all of
them at one time or another-seek assiduously to expand and fine-
tune judicial review of agency action, usually advocating a variety of
institutional and doctrinal reforms for those purposes..8 They suppose,
at least by implication, that what courts do matters substantively-that
when a court decides that an agency erred or failed adequately to
support its action, the court's ruling actually (and notjust normatively)
controls the agency's subsequent behavior in that case. This behavioral
supposition, after all, is one of the raisons d'etre of most of adminis-
trative law. The conventional explanation forjudicial review of agency
action is the need to confine agencies to their legal authority. To deny
that courts actually perform this task is to raise dark and difficult ques-
tions about the compatibility of the administrative state with the rule
of law. 9
On the other hand, academic discussion of this question (sometimes
by the very same writers) often proceeds as if the axiom of judicial
control of agency action were empirically false.' 0 Certain inexorable
conditions, it is said, limit the capacity of reviewing courts to shape an
agency's conduct. Pointing to factors such as the narrow "bite" of legal
doctrine, the political context of administrative decisionmaking, judi-
cial deference to agency expertise, the scope of agency discretion, an
agency's control of its agenda, the limited resources of litigants, and
the protracted nature of agency proceedings, these commentators em-
7Mashaw & Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4
YALEJ. ON RF.G. 257, 275 (1987).
8E.g., Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government, Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUm. L. REV. 573 (1984); K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTIcF-A PRE-
LIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).
'See, e.g., Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUNI. L. REV. 1
(1983).
"'K. DAviS, supra note 8, at 27, 216 (agency discretion limits effectiveness ofjudicial
review).
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phasize that in practice if not in principle, an agency usually has the
last word as well as the first."I
Which of these views is correct? We suspected that there was con-
siderable truth in both of them-that judicial review "matters" in all
cases (if only because review causes delay and additional cost before
the agency's action can be implemented), but that it has different ef-
fects depending upon a variety of factors. That much, of course, can
be confidently asserted about virtually any legal phenomenon as com-
plex as the interaction between courts and agencies. The more inter-
esting and challenging questions are whether research is capable of
identifying those factors and effects, discerning significant patterns in
the relationship among them, and deriving systematic conclusions that
can illuminate the ways in which reviewing courts actually shape agency
behavior.
Believing that such a possibility must at least be entertained, we un-
dertook a large-scale empirical study of how federal agency actions
fare when they are directly reviewed by appellate courts. Although we
were especially interested in the fate of cases that a reviewing court
remands to the initiating agency for further proceedings, we antici-
pated that such a study could also be designed to generate data bearing
upon a number of other important, albeit subsidiary, features of ad-
ministrative law.
In the course of our study, we came to appreciate all too well how
problematic such research must inevitably be. The government does
publish data on the number, type, and judicial disposition of the ad-
ministrative cases that are appealed to the federal courts.'2 But those
data, while useful, are too highly aggregated to answer most of the
more refined questions that we hoped to answer. We were therefore
obliged to gather our own data in ways that are described below in
Part II, consoling ourselves with the conviction that on questions of
this importance and interest, even imperfect information is better than
perfect ignorance.
II.
We began our study with four principal objectives in mind. First, we
hoped to describe the general parameters of judicial review of federal
administrative action. While recognizing the diversity of agencies,
agency actions, reviewing courts, and judicial dispositions of agency
ISee generally M. SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
(1968). Practitioners, needless to say, find themselves on all sides of this question; their
positions depend not only upon their experiences and orientations but also upon
whether they are seeking to persuade their clients to challenge or to defend the
agency's position.
'
2See, e.g., ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECIOR.
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cases, we attempted to render that diversity manageable by focusing
our attention upon some broad categories of information. For exam-
ple, we wanted to establish the number of agency decisions that are
reviewed by the courts of appeal; the proportion of those cases that
are affirmed, reversed, and remanded by the courts; the frequency
with which remanded cases are remanded for particular reasons; and
the distribution of these variables among the different federal agencies
and courts of appeals. At the same time, we hoped to shed light upon
some ancillary, but potentially interesting attributes of judicial review
of agency decisions, such as the length and footnoting of judicial opin-
ions, the number of split decisions, the size of appellate panel, the type
of agency proceeding being reviewed, and the frequency with which
the courts applied different standards of review. To that end, we de-
cided to read a large,' 3 representative 4 sample of opinions in which
federal courts of appeal engaged in direct review of agency action.
Second, we hoped to reveal some of the dynamic patterns of admin-
istrative law by gathering these kinds of data for cases decided over a
period of time that would bracket the two decades, 1965 to 1985,
during which judicial review of agency action, by most accounts, ex-
perienced transformative conceptual and doctrinal changes.' 6 We
therefore decided to read opinions rendered during five discrete time
periods. Four of them were six-month periods: in 1965, just before
that transformation is thought to have begun; in 1974-75, at a midway
point during that twenty-year period; in 1984, after the transforma-
tion would have concluded and just before Chevron was decided; and
in 1985, after the Supreme Court reaffirmed and clarified Chevron.
The fifth time period covered two months in early 1988, which was
selected in order to learn whether the observed changes during the
1984-85 period had endured.
The 1984-85 period had the virtue of being close enough to the
present to reflect the current state of administrative law (at least as
revealed by our data), while also being distant enough from the present
to facilitate our most important and most elusive objective: to reveal
'"The total number of cases in our 1965-1985 sample was 2325, consisting of 372
decided in 1965, 277 decided in 1974-75, and 1676 decided in 1984-85. The number
of cases in our 1988 sample was 147. The grand total, therefore, was 2472 cases. The
data sets, and the reasons for constituting them as we did, are explained infra.
14Our sample included cases from each of the 16 appellate courts (the District of
Columbia Circuit, the eleven numbered circuits, the Court of Claims, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, the Federal Circuit, and the Temporary Emergency
Court of Appeals) which heard direct appeals from executive branch agencies during
the period under study. A list of the agencies, together with their coding keys, is
appended as Appendix A.
'"We excluded all cases, such as Social Security Act adjudications, that had come to
the courts of appeal through the federal district courts or through specialized judicial
tribunals such as the U.S. Tax Court.
'6See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667
(1975).
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what actually happens when appellate courts remand cases to federal
agencies for further proceedings. For this purpose, it was necessary
that enough time had elapsed since the remand for the vast majority
of remanded cases to have reached their conclusions so that we could
analyze them as part of our data set.' 7
In order to learn what had transpired after the cases were remanded
to the agencies, we conducted telephone (and occasionally personal)
interviews with the lawyer who represented the agency and with the
lawyer who represented the petitioner, in each of the roughly 180
cases during the 1984-85 period in which a court of appeal had re-
manded the case to the agency for further proceedings. 8 Those in-
terviews were designed to elicit data bearing upon two "facts": the
specific post-remand events (about which there was seldom much dis-
agreement between the opposing lawyers), and the parties' evaluation
of the outcomes (about which disagreement was more common) that
could not always be resolved by attempting to integrate the lawyers'
differing perceptions.
Our final objective explains why we defined and divided the 1985
period precisely as we did. By doing so, we hoped to learn how the
Court's Chevron decision, as clarified and reaffirmed eight months later
in Chemical Manufacturers Association v. Natural Resources Defense
Council,19 had affected appellate court review of agency action. In
Chevron the Supreme Court sent a strong signal to the courts of appeal
that they should be more deferential in reviewing interpretations of
statutes by administrative agencies.
Even before we initiated our study, Chevron had occasioned a great
deal of published commentary, most of it viewing (and often denounc-
17When we ended the data collection in early 1988, two categories of remanded
cases remained incomplete: (1) those in which the lawyers had not provided all of the
necessary information during the initial and follow-up interviews, and (2) those that
had still been "open" (i.e., post-remand activity was still ongoing) at that point. In an
effort to include these cases in our data set, we made one final pass at them in August,
1988, well after we had begun our preliminary data analysis. Even at that late date,
some three to five years after the remand, we found that a certain number of cases
remained in one or both of these categories. We had to drop them from the data set,
at least as far as our analyses of post-remand events and evaluation of outcomes were
concerned.
"
8At the written request of the Administrative Conference of the U.S., each federal
agency identified a contact person within the agency (usually in the general counsel's
office) who would help to facilitate the data gathering for the study. The identity of
the agency's and petitioner's lawyers was also usually obtainable from the published
opinions.
We generally sought to interview the most junior lawyer listed there. Our assump-
tion-that this would be the lawyer closest to, and most knowledgeable about, the
details of the case-proved to be generally correct. Sometimes, of course, the lawyers
who were in the best position to answer our questions were no longer employed by
the agency or firm. In those cases, the interviewer attempted to locate that lawyer and
when that effort failed, the interviewer was almost always able to obtain the desired
information from someone else in the agency or law firm who was (or after reviewing
the file could become) familiar with the matter.
'470 U.S. 116 (1985).
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ing) the decision as a watershed administrative law ruling that would
encourage reviewing courts to defer to agency interpretations and pol-
icy directions, and thereby slow if not reverse the more intrusive pat-
terns of judicial review that had gathered force during the preceding
two decades. For that reason, we read cases covering the six-month
period preceding Chevron and the six-month period following Chemical
Manufacturers Association.20
For purposes of managing and analyzing our data set, we initially
divided it into seven subsets of cases, each with its own computerized
(Lotus 1-2-3) data file. These seven files were: (1) the 1965 cases (re-
mand and non-remand), 2' which we called "65CASES"; (2) the 1974-
75 cases (remand and non-remand), 22 which we called "75CASES"; (3)
the 1984 non-remand cases (defined as those which an appellate court
had disposed of without remanding them to the agency), which we
called "84CASES"; (4) the 1984 remand cases (defined as those which
an appellate court had, in the first instance, remanded to the agency
for further proceedings),23 which we called "84REMAND.; (5) the
1985 non-remand cases, which we called "85CASES"; (6) the 1985
remand cases,2 4 which we called "85REMAND"; and (7) the 1988
cases, 25 which we called "88CASES." Then, to facilitate those analyses
for which the distinctions between remand and non-remand cases or
between pre-Chevron and post-Chevron cases were not relevant, we ag-
gregated the 1984 and 1985 cases by creating (8) a merged file of all
1984 cases, which we called "84MERGE"; (9) a merged file of all 1985
cases, which we called "85MERGE"; and (10) a file further combining
these merged files, which we called "8485ALL." These ten files con-
tained data that had been generated in two ways: by analyzing the
published opinions (with respect to all 1965 and 1974-75 cases and the
1984-85 non-remand cases), and by that kind of opinion analysis plus
20Although this means that we actually read cases covering five time periods, we
treat the two six-month periods during 1985 as a single time period for purposes other
than that of analyzing the effects of Chevron.21The 1965 sample covered cases decided during the six-month period between
January 1 and June 30, 1965.22The 1974-75 sample covered cases decided during the six-month period between
October 15, 1974 and April 15, 1975. The latter date was selected as the cutoff date
in order to just antedate the Supreme Court's decision on April 16, 1975 in Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Train, 421 U.S. 60 (1975), a case which anticipated
Chevron in mandating deference to agency constructions of statutes.
2'The 1984 sample (both non-remand and remand cases) covered cases decided
during the six-month period between December 25, 1983 and June 25, 1984, the day
Chevron was decided.24The 1985 sample (both non-remand and remand cases) covered cases decided
during the six-month period between February 28, 1985 (the day after Chemical Man-
ufacturers was decided) and August 31, 1985.
2 The 1988 sample covered cases decided during the two-month period between
March 1, 1988 and April 30, 1988.
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subsequent telephone interviews (with respect to the 1984 and 1985
remand cases).26
The 1676 appellate cases that we analyzed for the 1984-85 period
were generated in the first instance by almost 50 different administra-
tive agencies.17 Among other things, we hoped to learn whether dif-
ferent agencies generated different patterns of appellate review and
handled remands differently. For two reasons, we found it useful to
group the agencies for analytical purposes. First, relatively few agen-
cies accounted for a high proportion of the cases studied while the
great majority of agencies produced very few.28 This meant that ana-
lyzing the agencies individually would often preclude statistically sig-
nificant findings, while grouping them into larger clusters might avoid
this problem. Second, we believed that certain groupings would help
us to discern broad patterns that might otherwise remain obscured.
Accordingly, we devised nine agency groups and allocated each agency
in our data set to one of them.2 9
The case analyses, interviews, and data recordation were perfornied
under our supervision from early 1987 to March 1989 by a group of
21These data had been recorded by the researchers on individual coding sheets, one
for each case. The final coding sheet, which is reproduced as Appendix B, differs from
several earlier versions, but only slightly. The changes were made in order to (1) add
some items of information that could be adduced entirely from analysis of the pub-
lished opinions (e.g., item AA relating to the standard of review); (2) refine some of
the data categories (e.g., item K relating to the number of judges; item N relating to
the result code); (3) correct obvious errors; and (4) permit computer programming. A
coding key was also prepared to facilitate the uniform coding of the data.
2l'1The number of agencies was smaller during the two earlier periods covered by
the study, partly because fewer appellate cases were decided during those periods and
partly because there were then fewer agencies. Because of the temporal parameters
of our data set, some relatively low-volume agencies (e.g., the Consumer Product Safety
Commission) do not have any cases in the data set.21Three sources of agency cases-the Merit Systems Protection Board, the National
Labor Relations Board, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (sometimes
through the Board of Immigration Appeals)-together accounted for approximately
57% of the cases decided during the 1984-85 study period. Before the creation of the
MSPB, the NLRB generated the most cases, accounting for 31.7% of the total in 1965
and 41.5% in 1975.
"We formed these groups and assigned particular agencies to them on the basis of
a combination of analytical criteria and the frequency with which certain agencies
appeared in our data set. The groups are: (1) the National Labor Relations Board; (2)
health, safety, and environment regulatory agencies; (3) other regulatory agencies; (4)
the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Board of Immigration Appeals;
(5) the Merit Systems Protection Board, which accounted for by far the largest number
of cases (27.5% in the 1984-85 period); (6) the Department of Labor; (7) executive
departments other than the Department of Labor; (8) the Patent Office; and (9) all
other agencies. The agencies included in each group are listed in Appendix A. These
designations are arbitrary in the sense that they represent only one of many ways in
which the caseload could have been sliced. The labels used for some of these groups
are also crude. Thus, for example, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Com-
mission and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, which are in-
cluded in group (2), are not really regulatory agencies. And although the Federal
Aviation Administration and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration cer-
tainly fit well in this group, we coded them instead to the departments of Transpor-
tation and Labor, respectively.
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law students at Georgetown and then at Yale, each of whom had com-
pleted a basic course in administrative law.3 0 Once the data had been
gathered, coded, and error-corrected, they were entered into a com-
puter and preliminarily analyzed.
Like all teachers and practitioners of administrative law, we did not
'We took a number of precautions to satisfy ourselves that the students' analyses
of the published opinions and their coding of the data were reasonably accurate and
uniform.
There was little risk of error with respect to most of the data collected from the
published opinions, which data were objective and straightforward in nature. Only
two pieces of data in the opinions could not be coded without some exercise of judg-
ment: the type of agency proceeding (item M on the coding sheet) and-a more
difficult characterization-the reasons for remands (item N).
In order to achieve a high level of uniformity in characterizing the type of agency
proceeding, we reviewed with the students the differences between adjudication, rule-
making, and ratemaking, and discussed the kinds of agency actions that might fall into
the "other" category. We then instructed each of the students to read a random sample
of cases, classify the type of agency proceeding involved in each, and bring any disputed
classifications to us, whereupon we met as a group and resolved the few disputes in a
way that further clarified the categories for the students.
Characterizing the reasons for remands was (because the courts' published opinions
were not always entirely clear on the point) more difficult and we therefore felt obliged
to be even more circumspect. First, we instructed all students to read a classic article
by the late Judge Henry Friendly, which had elaborated the taxonomy of remands
that we had found useful and wished to employ in the study. We then discussed that
taxonomy as a group at some length. Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal
and Remand of Administrative Orders, 1969 DUKE L.J. 199. Before permitting the stu-
dents to read any of the cases to be covered by the study, we asked each of them to
read and to complete coding sheets for an identical random sample of cases and then
to meet among themselves to discuss any instances in which some or all of them had
classified the reasons for a particular remand differently. After that, we met as a group
to discuss those differences as well as any uncertainties that remained. We also en-
couraged the students to raise with us any questions that might arise when they ana-
lyzed the cases covered by the study, and we resolved those questions in weekly meetings
that both of us and all of the students (with occasional exceptions) attended. After the
students had completed all of the case analyses and coding sheets, we asked a lawyer
with extensive administrative law experience in a federal agency to review for accuracy
each of the cases and the students' coding sheets, making changes where appropriate.
In addition, the authors reviewed each of the cases and coding sheets as to which that
lawyer had raised any question, and we made the appropriate changes.
The authors adopted two additional reliability checks that should be standard pro-
cedure for studies of this kind. First, we each read several volumes of the Federal
Reporter and checked our codings of the cases against those that the research assistants
had compiled, going over any discrepancies with them in order to resolve any apparent
misapprehensions. Second, we generated a list of key words and phrases that could be
the basis for a computerized search for the cases that should be in our data sets. We
then tested the reliability of this search technique by comparing its outputs to the
cases contained in the relevant volumes of the Federal Reporter, enabling us to refine
further the list of key words and phrases. Because this technique holds much promise
for future research of this kind, we describe it in some detail in Appendix C.
Coding the data generated by the telephone interviews usually required only that
the students accurately transcribe what the lawyers told them, not that they exercise
independent judgment. The opposing lawyers seldom told them inconsistent things
and when they did, the students simply recorded those differences on the coding sheet.
Given the large number of cases in the data set and the limited experience of the
students, we suspect that even these precautions failed to detect some errors. Never-
theless, we believe that the number of such errors cannot be large enough to affect
the general conclusions that we have reached from our analysis.
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come to the subject without preconceptions. Indeed, we began with a
variety of beliefs, ranging from weak intuitions to firm convictions
about what we would find. These beliefs formed the basis for a number
of preliminary hypotheses concerning a range of administrative law
phenomena that we hoped our data would illuminate. Most of these
hypotheses-and certainly the more important ones from our point
of view-relate to judicial remands. They concern, for example, how
court size, agency type, proceeding type, and other such variables af-
fect remands; how agencies respond to remands of various kinds; how
long different administrative proceedings take to complete; and how
these relationships have changed over time. Our data set, however,
also enabled us to cast some light upon the evolution of certain other
features of administrative law that are not specific to judicial remands,
including the "style" ofjudicial opinions and some of the institutional
structures within which administrative law is generated.
Much of our data was in aggregated form. Although we disaggre-
gated it at many points-by agency, circuit, proceeding type, court
size, time period, and disposition on appeal (itself broken down into
several categories and subcategories), for example-our classification
of the cases employed variables that could be gleaned from the face of
the opinions themselves, from an analysis of the content of those opin-
ions, or (in the case of the discussion of post-remand events) from
information obtained from lawyers, some of which is undeniably im-
pressionistic.
We were acutely aware that these variables did not capture all or
even most of the factors that explain why reviewing courts and agen-
cies decide as they do. The list of other factors that also powerfully
shape their decisions would surely be a long one. It would certainly
include factors such as the political environment in which the agency
operates, the quality of the agency's personnel, lawyering, and other
resources vis-?i-vis those of private parties, the legal culture surround-
ing the agency, the respect in which it is held by litigants and reviewing
courts, its technical competence, its statutory framework, and the like."
Although such factors would unquestionably help one to predict and
explain agency and reviewing court behavior, we did not discuss them
much in our study because they were tangential to our purposes. Our
intention was not to analyze the behavior of particular agencies or
reviewing courts (although we devoted some attention to trends in the
D.C. Circuit). Instead, our purposes were to uncover broad patterns
and general trends in administrative law and, with respect to our dis-
lo cite just one example, Professor Linda Hirshman notes that the fact that NLRB
orders have no effect until they are enforced by the circuit court "creates a culture
among labor lawyers of considering all NLRB orders as very tentative, [which] would
have a big effect on the statistics throughout [this study]. They should be resisted
much more often and reversed . . . more often." Letter from Linda Hirshman to E.
Donald Elliott (Jan. 18, 1990).
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cussion of Chevron, to gauge how an unusually controversial adminis-
trative law decision of the Supreme Court has actually affected
reviewing court (and indirectly, agency) behavior. Our data, we think,
were quite adequate for those purposes.
III.
Our study had four broad objectives. First, we hoped to produce
some baseline information about the character, magnitude, and con-
sequences of judicial review of federal agency decisions. Second, by
comparing this information at different points during a period span-
ning two decades (1965-85) in which the court-agency relationship is
widely thought to have undergone a transformation, we hoped to dis-
cern changes in these parameters over time. Third, we hoped to learn
more about remands, especially about what actually happens when the
cases go back to the agencies that originated them. Finally, we hoped
to gauge the effectiveness of the Supreme Court's highly controversial
effort in Chevron to regulate the court-agency relationship through a
change in legal doctrine.
Although we believe that our analysis increases our understanding
on each of these points, we regard our findings as more suggestive
than conclusive. Like the data on which they are based, these findings
are incomplete and in some cases impressionistic. They cannot, nor do
they purport to, begin to capture the rich complexity and diversity of
federal administrative law. In this regard, detailed case studies can
provide far more textured accounts of court-agency relationships than
our data permit.3 2
But such texture and detail come at a price. Being agency-specific,
they can tell us little about the larger patterns which the broad spec-
trum of federal agencies and courts trace on the political-legal land-
scape. These larger patterns can only be discerned through the kind
of panoramic, systemic, inevitably imprecise bird's-eye view attempted
here. That view requires that a much richer database be amassed and
a greater analytical effort mounted.""
We organize this summary of our principal findings around the four
goals of the study.
:"See, e.g., R. MELNICK, supra note 3 (Environmental Protection Agency);J. MASItAW,
BURE.AUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983) (Social Security Administration); J. MAS.AnW & D.
HARFST, REGULATING THF FREEDOM MACHINE (forthcoming, 1990) (National High-
way Traffic Safety Administration). See also D. Rosenbloom, The Federal Labor Re-
lations Authority (1988) (unpublished manuscript). See also research mentioned supra
note 2.
3:qThe data compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts is
useful but is only a starting point for analysis. An earlier recommendation by the
Administrative Conference of the United States looked in this direction. ACUS Rec-
ommendation No. 69-6, Compilation of Statistics on Administrative Proceedings by
Federal Departments and Agencies, I C.F.R. § 305.69-6 (1988).
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THE CHANGING STYLE OF APPELLATE OPINIONS
Our first finding, based on data published by the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts, is well known: the administrative law case-
load in the circuit courts has increased rapidly and, at least as measured
by what the Office calls "merits terminations" (as distinguished from
filings), fairly steadily. Less well known (but also based on that pub-
lished data) is that this larger caseload constitutes a rather small and
steadily shrinking portion of the circuit courts' dockets-only 7% in
1987.
A striking finding with possibly large implications for administrative
law concerns the phenomenon of "table decisions"-summary deci-
sions for which no reasoning or factual description is published in the
Federal Reporter.3 4 Today, the majority of administrative law cases
are disposed of in this way. In 1985, almost 60% of all dispositions
were by these "table decisions," compared to 38% in 1975 and an
unknown number in 1965.
This phenomenon has begun to receive attention from academic
commentators, 35 yet its significance for administrative law is not yet
clear. It is tempting to speculate on how the predominance of table
decisions has affected the affirmance rate, yet even the direction of
causality remains uncertain. As one might expect, most of these table
decisions are affirmances, although a surprisingly large number are
"'Some of the circuits have recently begun to provide to LEXIS and WESTLAW
memoranda and opinions underlying these decisions.
'.,See, e.g., Songer, Criteria for Publication of Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals:
Formal Rules Versus Empirical Reality, 73 JUDICA-1-URE 307 (1990); Robel, The Myth of
the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants in the U.S. Courts
of Appeals, 87 Mi c H. L. REV. 940 (1989); Weaver, The Precedential Value of Unpublished
Judicial Opinions, 39 MERCER L. REV. 477 (1988); R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CRISIS AND REFORM 120-24 (1985). See alsoJustice Stephens' opinion in County of Los
Angeles v. Kling, 474 U.S. 936, 940 (1985); Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation of
Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI.
L. RE-V. 573 (1981); Note, Unreported Decisions in the U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 63 CORNELL
L. RE-v. 129 (1977). See also Judge Wald's separate statement in National Classification
Comm. v. United States, 765 F.2d 164, 172-75 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Ginsburg, The Obli-
gation to Reason Why, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 205, 218-23 (1985); D. STIENSTRA, UNPUB-
LISHED DISPOSITIONS: PROBLEMS OF ACCESS AND USE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS(1985).
There has also been criticism of rules in some circuits that permit a party to request
publication of an opinion. See Reynolds & Richman, Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited
Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 1167, 1179 n.72 (1978). There has been somewhat more commentary on the
impact of publication rules in particular circuits. See Comment, A Snake in the Path of
the Law: The 9th Circuit's Non-Publication Rule, 39 U. Prir. L. REV. 309 (1977); Reynolds
& Richman, Limited Publication in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, 1979 DUKE L.J. 807.
For commentary on the impact of limited publication in state courts of appeal, see
Newbern & Wilson, Rule 21: Unprecedent and the Disappearing Court, 32 ARK. L. REV.
37 (1978); Render, On Unpublished Opinions, 73 KY. L.J. 145 (1984-85); Andreani,
Independent Panels to Choose Publishable Opinions: A Solution to the Problems of California's
Selective Publication System, 12 PAC. L. J. 727 (1981).
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not.36 The dramatically increased use of table dispositions may reflect
an increase in affirmances caused by other factors; in this view, table
decisions are simply a less time-consuming way to clearjudicial dockets
than writing full published opinions. On the other hand, table deci-
sions may be a cause of a higher affirmance rate, rather than (or as well
as) an effect. In this view, docket considerations motivate reviewing
courts to dispose of cases summarily, and summary dispositions can be
accomplished most readily through affirmance rather than reversal or
remand. Unfortunately, our data do not permit us to determine which
of these views is correct, although the signficant number of table de-
cisions that do not affirm tends to undercut the latter.
The potential importance of table decisions, however, goes well be-
yond its positive association with the affirmance rate. This method of
promulgating decisions raises fundamental questions of legal process,
legitimacy, and public perception. When courts dispose of a large num-
ber of agency cases summarily and without opinion, administrative law
is to that extent deprived of the benefits of reasoned justification. In
that event, it loses the salutary intellectual discipline and normative
significance that opinion writing imposes and its processes and out-
comes appear arbitrary. Without reason-giving, administrative law be-
comes even more opaque and incoherent than it already is. On the
other hand, routine cases should be handled routinely and busy courts
should not have to expend scarce time and effort belaboring the ob-
vious and familiar. Because table decisions' domination of the admin-
istrative law caseload has occurred swiftly and without adequate
reflection, it is by no means clear that the current practice strikes the
optimal balance between these competing considerations. This phe-
nomenon clearly warrants further investigation.
Our findings concerning opinion length and footnoting are of lesser
importance, of course, but a few of them are nevertheless of some
interest for what they may reveal about the emerging style of admin-
istrative law opinion-writing and the effect of docket pressures. In gen-
eral, opinions written in the mid-1980s were much shorter on average
than those written a decade earlier, although this effect is almost en-
tirely due to the effect on averages of the courts' increased use of table
decisions. The D.C. Circuit writes longer and more heavily footnoted
opinions than the other circuits; in this respect it is even more of an
outlier than it was in 1975.
Of greater significance perhaps is our finding that consensus within
circuit courts, as measured by the proportion of one-opinion cases,
increased in all circuits between 1965 and 1975 and remained un-
changed a decade later even when table decisions are excluded. In-
1''According to one study, almost 25% of the circuit court decisions reversing, va-
cating, or denying a lower court or agency decision in 1984 were unpublished; the
figure for the sixth circuit was 41.9%. D. STIFNSIRA, supra note 35, at Table 3.
FALL 1990
42 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 519
cluding them, of course, would dramatically strengthen this consensus
index. Maintenance of this level of consensus at a time (1984-85) well
into an administration that was determined to appoint federal judges
of a different ideological stripe is impressive. Again, the D.C. Circuit
was an outlier; in all periods its consensus level was lower than that in
the other circuits. Yet even the D.C. Circuit's consensus level appeared
to increase between 1975 and 1984-85, although more recent ap-
pointments to that court may well have reduced that consensus.
THE AGES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The most important finding that emerges from our twenty-year
punctuated longitudinal analysis is that the circuit courts are affirming
agency decisions at a steadily increasing rate, a rate that approximated
76% in 1984-85 and reached over 81% in 1985 just after Chevron.
When we measure the petitioners' probability of success-combining
the reversals and the 40% of the remands in which the lawyers report
a "major change" in the agency's position on remand-we find that
it was about 12% in 1985, a figure that our 1988 data suggest may
have increased slightly as Chevron's effect weakened. A success rate of
only 12% raises an important question about why petitioners appeal
as frequently as they do. We speculated that with respect to some but
not all agencies, the explanation may partly be found in the possibilities
for using appeals to delay the effect of agency action. This question
clearly warrants further research.
Our findings concerning the growth of rulemaking were somewhat
surprising. Although rulemaking's share of the administrative law
caseload increased twentyfold between 1965 and 1984-85, it still con-
stituted only 6.5% in the latter period. Even more striking is the fact
that when we excluded from our analysis agencies that apparently never
used rulemaking and examined only those that sometimes use it, rule-
making's share was still only 9.4% in 1984-85, a share that was actually
lower than it had been in 1975. We speculated that reviewing courts'
imposition of adjudicatory-type procedural and evidentiary burdens
on rulemaking during this period may have had the perverse effect of
discouraging its use.
This finding relates to our finding concerning the agency composi-
tion of the administrative law caseload, which has changed dramati-
cally since 1965. A docket once dominated by labor and patent cases
is now dominated by labor, personnel, and immigration cases-vir-
tually all of which are adjudications. Agencies that engage in "social
regulation" accounted for less than 4% of the caseload in 1984-85.
When we examined the circuit court composition of the caseload, we
found that the D.C. Circuit's share of the national administrative law
docket remained remarkably stable over the twenty-year period, com-
prising about 12% in 1984-85. The Federal Circuit's share of 36%
was the largest, distantly followed by the Ninth Circuit (15%). Another
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striking finding was the steady decline in, and the rarity of, en banc
decisions, especially outside the Federal Circuit. Only about 2% of the
cases were heard en banc in 1984-85.
REMANDS AND THE CHEVRON EFFECT
If our data on dispositions and the use of table decisions indicate a
growing tendency of reviewing courts to defer to agencies, our data
on remands also suggest that the Supreme Court's Chevron decision
has reinforced that deference, pushing the overall affirmance rate to
levels higher than those that prevailed in 1965, 1975, and 1984 just
before Chevron was decided. Affirmances increased by almost 15% af-
ter Chevron, and both remands and reversals declined by roughly 40%.
The post-Chevron affirmance rates, we found, were bimodally distrib-
uted; one group of agencies clustered around 80%, while another group
clustered around 60%. We suggested that the different subject matters
with which these two groups of agencies are concerned, reflected in
the fact that the first group relies almost exclusively on adjudication
while the other sometimes uses rulemaking, might help explain this
distribution.
When we refined our analysis of remands in order to appraise Chev-
ron's effect more precisely, four findings of interest emerged. First,
more of the increased affirmances after Chevron "came from" reduced
reversals than from reduced remands. This "outcome displacement
effect" was fully consistent with the purpose of Chevron, which was to
make it harder for reviewing courts to reverse for agency errors of
law. Second, Chevron was immediately followed by a large decline in
substantive law remands-the kind that Chevron aimed to discour-
age-while the remands remained constant. Although these data would
seem to establish that Chevron also had a pronounced "reasons dis-
placement effect," they are actually more equivocal than that. Third,
the increase in affirmance rates after Chevron had eroded by 1988; the
affirmance rate in 1988 had slipped to 75.5%, roughly halfway be-
tween the pre- and post-Chevron rates. Fourth, the remand rate in-
creased significantly between 1985 and 1988, although fewer of the
increased remands "came from" reversals than Chevron's logic had led
us to expect.
These findings suggest that Chevron affected outcomes differentially
and that those outcome effects differed over time. The expected af-
firmance-increasing effect occurred immediately but had weakened by
1988, while the expected remand-increasing effect did not occur im-
mediately but was evident in 1988. These findings are consistent with
the notions that Chevron achieved its intended goal in the short run,
and that post-Chevron developments, including the Supreme Court's
own weakening of Chevron in subsequent cases and the lower courts'
strategic responses to these decisions, frustrated those purposes as time
passed.
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When we disaggregated the data on the effects of Chevron by ex-
amining particular circuits and agencies, two other striking findings
emerged. We found that the D.C. Circuit, whose affirmance rates had
been lower than those of the other circuits throughout the twenty-year
period and were far lower by the time Chevron was decided, responded
to Chevron by affirming even less often than before, in sharp contrast
to the other circuits which responded to the decision by increasing
their already high affirmance rates. And the "outcome displacement
effect" of Chevron turned out to vary considerably among the agency
groups; the affirmance rate actually declined for the immigration agency
and the "other regulatory" group.
Taken as a whole, our findings with respect to the effects of Chevron
on remands, although not unequivocal, support a general conclusion
of some significance to the analysis of legal process in administrative
law. On the evidence of this study, the Supreme Court is able to ef-
fectively shape the court-agency relationship through the kind of rel-
atively broad, open-textured rule adopted in Chevron. For reasons that
we explained in the full-length published study, including the quite
different experience following the Court's Vermont Yankee decision,
this conclusion was unexpected.
WHAT HAPPENS AFTER REMAND
Our data concerning the response of agencies to judicial remands
yield one especially interesting finding. Our prediction that agencies
would manage to find ways to reaffirm their original decisions-what
we called "the agency gets the last word" hypothesis-was not borne
out. In approximately 40% of the remands, the agencies adopted "ma-
jor changes" and most appeared to do so primarily because of the re-
mand (i.e., on the basis of the old administrative record).
This 40% figure is much higher than we expected. But it does of
course mean that 60% of the remands did not result in any "major
changes." This means that petitioners succeeded in obtaining a major
change in the agency's position in only about 12% of the cases-the
8% in which the circuit court reversed the agency outright, plus 40%
of the 9% of the cases in which the court remanded and the agency
on remand adopted a major change.
Appendix A - Agencies and Agency Groupings
1. National Labor Relations Board
NLRB National Labor Relations Board
2. Health and Environment
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Environmental Protection Agency
Food & Drug Administration
Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commis-
sion
Occupational Safety & Health Review Commis-
sion
3. Other Regulatory Agencies
CAB Civil Aeronautics Board
CFTC Commodity Futures Trading Commission
FCC Federal Communications Commission
FEC Federal Elections Commission
FMC Federal Maritime Commission
FPC/FERC Federal Power Commission/Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission
FTC Federal Trade Commission
ICC Interstate Commerce Commission
SEC Securities & Exchange Commission
4. Immigration
INS Immigration & Naturalization Service
INS/BIA INS/Bureau of Immigration Affairs
5. Civil Service
CSC Civil Service Commission
MSPB Merit Systems Protection Board
MSPB/* Merit Systems Protection Board/*
6. Department of Labor
DOL Department of Labor
7. Other Departments
DHHS Department of Health & Human Services
DHUD Department of Housing & Urban Development
DOC Department of Commerce
DOD Department of Defense
DOE Department of Energy
DOED Department of Education
DOI Department of the Interior
DOJ Department of Justice
DOT Department of Transportation
DTRE Department of Treasury
USDA Department of Agriculture
8. Patent and Trademark Office
PAT Patent & Trademark Office
PTO Patent & Trademark Office
9. Other Administrative Agencies
ACTION
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BCA Board of Contract Appeals (see originating
agency)
CIR Commissioner of Internal Revenue
CRT Copyright Royalty Tribunal
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
FHLBB Federal Home Loan Bank Board
FLRA Federal Labor Relations Authority
FRB Federal Reserve Board
GAO General Accounting Office
GSA General Services Administration
INDCC Indian Claims Commission
IRS Internal Revenue Service
ITC International Trade Commission
OPM Office of Personnel Management
RRRB Railroad Retirement Board
SSA Social Security Administration
USPS U.S. Postal Service
VA Veterans Administration
WMATC Washington Metropolitan Authority Transit
Commission
Appendix B-Coding Sheet (5/15/88 draft)
Researcher: A. Case number __
B. Citation: - F2d _ C. D. Last Page




J. Circuit K. (circle) 1. 3-judge
2. en banc
3. Table (shepardize)
4. 4 or more, not en banc
L. Date - [last decision, e.g. reh. den.]
(mo) (day) (year)
M. Agency proceeding type (circle)
1. Adjudication 2. Rulemaking
3. Ratemaking 4. Other Describe:
5. No indication or Table Case
N. Result code (circle all that apply)-Reviewing court:
1. Affirmed in toto 2. Affirmed in part
Reversed:
3. No jurisdiction 4. Other
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* Remanded-law-based (supporting page)
5. Procedure 6. Substance
*7. Remanded-fact-based (supporting page)
*8. Remanded-rationale-based (supporting page)
9. Other (e.g. retained on docket)
10. Remanded-no indication of reason
11. Reversed-no indication of reason
Described (remands & other):
AA. Standard of Review (circle all that apply)
1. De novo 2. Error of law
3. Substantial evidence 4. Capricious and arbitrary
5. Abuse of discretion
6. Other (Describe):
7. No indication.
*(remands only) Petitioner's counsel
(firm) (city)
*(remands only) Agency counsel
Interview with Petitioner




0. Procedures after remand:
1. No further proceedings after remand.
Agency issued new opinion that:
2. Supplied additional explanations but no change in
legal theory or interpretation.
3. Adopted new legal theory or interpretation.
4. Agency supplemented record (additional evidence), but did
not hold new hearings.
5. Agency held additional hearings (oral or written).
6. Other (Describe):
P. Result after remand (circle all that apply) - Agency:
1. Re-affirmed earlier decision (no change in result).
2. Minor changes (Describe):
3. Major changes (Describe):
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4. Agreed to settlement.
5. Adopted new legal theory.
6. Agency relied on old facts (in record at time of remand).
7. Agency relied on new facts (not in record at remand).
8. Agency issued new notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
9. Agency dropped the proceeding.
10. Other (Describe):
Subsequent proceedings citation(s)
(please send copy if unpublished)
Q. "Which of the following would you say best describes the practical
effect on your client of the ultimate resolution by the agency after
the court's remand?" (circle one):
1. Much more favorable to client.
2. Only slightly more favorable to client.
3. About the same effect on client as before remand.
4. Less favorable to client.
5. No opinion, or won't say.
R. "In your opinion, did the court's remand affect the ultimate result
reached by the agency?"
1. Yes (Describe how):
2. No.
3. No opinion, or won't say.
S. "Were there any other significant intervening events between the
agency's original decision and its final decision which might help to
explain any changes?"
0. No, or don't know.
1. Change of national administration.
2. Change of agency head.
3. Change of agency staff or lawyer handling case.
4. Significant change of law (other than remand itself):
a. New legislation or amendment.
b. Other court decisions.
c. Change of agency policy.
5. Change in economic or competitive conditions.
6. Other (Describe):
T. Time elapsed between remand and





(case number) Date(s) of interview




U. Procedures after remand:
1. No further proceedings after remand.
Agency issued new opinion that:
2. Supplied additional explanations but no change in
legal theory or interpretation.
3. Adopted new legal theory or interpretation.
4. Agency supplemented record (additional evidence), but did
not hold new hearings.
5. Agency held additional hearings (oral or written).
6. Other (Describe):
V. Result after remand (circle all that apply) - Agency:
1. Re-affirmed earlier decision (no change in result).
2. Minor changes (Describe):
3. Major changes (Describe):
4. Agreed to settlement.
5. Adopted new legal theory.
6. Agency relied on old facts (in record at time of remand).
7. Agency relied on new facts (not in record at remand).
8. Agency issued new notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
9. Agency dropped the proceeding.
10. Other (Describe):
Subsequent proceedings citation(s)
(please send copy if unpublished)
W. "Which of the following would you say best describes the practical
effect on the petitioner (i.e. the regulated party that sought judi-
cial review) of the ultimate resolution by the agency after the court's
remand?" (circle one):
1. Much more favorable to petitioner.
2. Only slightly more favorable to petitioner.
3. About the same effect on petitioner as before remand.
4. Less favorable to petitioner.
5. No opinion, or won't say.
X. "In your opinion, did the court's remand affect the ultimate result
reached by the agency?"
1. Yes (Describe how):
2. No.
3. No opinion, or won't say.
Y. "Were there any other significant intervening events between the
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agency's original decision and its final decision which might help
to explain any changes?"
0. No, or don't know.
1. Change of national administration.
2. Change of agency head.
3. Change of agency staff or lawyer handling case.
4. Significant change of law (other than remand itself):
a. New legislation or amendment.
b. Other court decisions.
c. Change of agency policy.
5. Change in economic or competitive conditions.
6. Other (Describe):
Z. Time elapsed between remand and




Appendix C - Use of WESTLAW in Empirical Research
A. USE OF ELECTRONIC SOURCES FOR
EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH
As in all empirical research, there is the possibility of error in the
data collection process of a project this large. To minimize this risk,
we utilized WESTLAW computer search techniques to screen West's
collection of federal appellate decisions to identify the set of cases that
our research assistants should have included in their data collection.
We decided to attempt the search rather late in the study's process,
after the research assistants had completed the hammer-and-tongs
screening of thousands of cases in the volumes of the Federal Reporter.
Our hope, of course, was that the WESTLAW search would generate
the identical or nearly identical set of cases as the research assistants.
Because we had used so many research assistants over the course of
the study's almost three-year duration, using another source to check
the data gathered was a valuable means of enhancing consistency among
the results of the data collection. We were indeed grateful for being
able to use the technique; checking the results of the WESTLAW search
against the database identified several "holes" in the databases that we
filled before completing the analyses. One very important instance of
this was our discovery that the cases in one volume of the Federal
Reporter had not been catalogued at all, suggesting either that there
was some misunderstanding by at least one research assistant about his
or her assignment or that there was a problem with our data entry
process. Although the total number of other data collection errors was
probably not significant in terms of the statistical results of the study,
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the error-checking process was, nonetheless, a valuable means of en-
suring that the data we received from the research assistants was con-
sistent with what we expected them to gather.
Our experience with this technique suggests that WESTLAW-based
search methods have many potential avenues for researchers' empiri-
cal needs. Instead of using the search results merely to check the ac-
curacy of a database generated by other means, researchers may gain
enough confidence in the search techniques to use them as primary
sources for data. Legal research has, in the main, not benefitted nearly
so much from empirical research as the social science disciplines. This
is somewhat puzzling, given the social science backgrounds of many
legal scholars. The reason lies principally in the fact that collecting
data for empirical legal research is frequently a cumbersome, tedious,
and expensive process. 7
Computer-based research could be of benefit in at least three ways.
The first is speed. Once one is confident that a search technique is
appropriately defined for generating the cases needed for an empirical
study, WESTLAW can search volumes of case law in a small fraction
of the time that a hammer-and-tongs method requires.
Second, WESTLAW creates a permanent record of the method of
the search. Perhaps no amount of training research assistants will elim-
inate the certain unease that results from wondering whether all of
the assistants apply the screening criteria in the same way. With WEST-
LAW, the researcher's translation of the research objective into a search
request provides a record of how the data were generated, a record
which other researchers can criticize and improve upon. The process
would be similar to the methodological debates in the social sciences
over how to translate the variables of a hypothesis into data that can
be measured in the real world or under laboratory conditions. Even if
researchers agree about a hypothesis, strong disagreement may persist
over the best way to observe and measure the phenomenon. Com-
puter-based research offers the opportunity for the same type of de-
bate and verification in legal research.
Third, computer-based research may be the only economical way to
transcend the tendency of legal scholars to discuss only a handful of
key cases in their efforts to describe the evolution of a legal system or
doctrine. As discussed earlier in the paper, see supra text at pages 517-
"
7The process of reviewing thousands of cases to identify those which fit the re-
searcher's criteria can be both economically and psychologically costly, problems per-
haps worse than those encountered in the social sciences, where many standardized
data classifications and categorizations already exist and where experimental tech-
niques are more prevalent. Electronic legal research potentially offers legal academics
similar benefits-tremendous collections of data, broken down into categories and
subdivisions. Of course, the existing categories and subdivisions will not be appropriate
for all empirical research needs. But the flexibility available in tailoring an electronic
search to a researcher's needs means that a scholar's research potential is not limited
to the conceptualizations of the computerized databases' authors.
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20, legal scholars too seldom examine the empirical manifestations of
changes in legal doctrine. A primary reason for this is the difficulty of
sifting through the accelerating numbers of volumes of reported cases
and statutes to collect the needed data. This voluminous amount of
data currently limits researchers to relatively small data sets in their
empirical work.
B. THE SEARCH PROCEDURE OF OUR STUDY
The purpose of the search was to scan the WESTLAW federal ap-
pellate court files to locate the cases that belong in our 1965 and 1975
data sets. The criteria for locating "included" cases, therefore, was
that each case: (i) had to be an appeal from an administrative agency;
(ii) had to be within the appropriate time period; (iii) must not have
been a tax-related decision; and (iv) must not have been an appeal from
a district court. The searches are reproduced below, following the
general descriptions.
Narrowing the searches by date was fairly straightforward; WEST-
LAW needs only the beginning and ending dates. We then narrowed
the search by topic by examining the WESTLAW "Topic List," flag-
ging all topics related to administrative law, and then including them
in the general search. The topics we chose appear in the searches be-
low. Then, to minimize the. possibility of missing some entries by not
selecting all of the appropriate topics, we added a search of the syllabus
of each case for the word "administrative" (as in "appeal from admin-
istrative ordear") or "petition" (as in "petition from [x] agency" or
"petition for review"). Finally, to eliminate the possibility of including
tax-related or district court cases, we eliminated entries for which the
syllabus contained "tax**," "taxation," "taxable" or "district." 38
The search for 1975 was:
DA(AFT 1-1-65 & BEF 7-1-65) & (TOPIC (15A 24 77 83H 92H 99 114
148A 190 199 232A 243 258 450 283 291 300 304 306 310 313A 317
317A 320 339 349B 356A 372 382 383 404 405 411 412 413 414)
SY(ADMINISTRATIVE PETITION)) % SY(TAX** TAXATION
TAXABLE DISTRICT).
And for 1965:
DA(AFT 1-1-65 & BEF 7-1-65) & (TOPIC (15A 24 77 83H 92H 99 114
148A 190 199 232A 243 258 450 283 291 300 304 306 310 313A 317
:'The district court screen may seem crude but is actually highly accurate. The
syllabus of every case that is an appeal from a district court contains the phrase
"appeal from the district court of _," and the word "district" is used very rarely
for other purposes. While checking the results of the search against our database, we
discovered a few cases in our database that WESTLAW eliminated by virtue of the
search procedure's elimination of cases based on other constructions of "district" (e.g.,
"water district"), but the number was very small. If we were to run another search
with the same goal of eliminating appeals from district courts, we would screen by
"district court" instead of by "district" only.
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317A 320 339 349B 356A 372 382 383 404 405 411 412 413 414)
SY(ADMINISTRATIVE PETITION)) % SY(TAX** TAXATION
TAXABLE DISTRICT).
In WESTLAW-ese, "or" is implied when there is no connector be-
tween entries. Therefore, SY(ADMINISTRATIVE PETITION)
translates to "the word ADMINISTRATIVE or the word PETITION
appears in the syllabus" (of course, both may appear). Further syntax
includes: % means "but not"; " *" is a universal ("wildcard") character
which permits any number of characters to appear in its location.
After conducting the WESTLAW search, one of our research assis-
tants matched the entries in our databases against the lists generated
by WESTLAW. He flagged those cases appearing on the WESTLAW
search but not in our database, and he then checked the new cases
identified by WESTLAW to see if we should include them. He also
checked those cases appearing in our databases which WESTLAW did
not pick up. This "double check" process led us to include a few ad-
ditional cases in the databases and to correct or delete some cases that
were already entered before conducting the final round of statistical
analyses.

